Taiwan, Identity Politics, and the Changing Status Quo

Tuesday, September 1, 2026, by Jerome F. Keating Ph.D.

What is the true national identity of Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC)? How do its people see it?

This seemingly simple question is quite complex and continues to gain in importance as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increases its gray-zone activities around the island nation and any hope of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is constantly threatened.

For Taiwanese and for the world, a crucial tell-tale illustration worth regularly reviewing in these times is the National Survey of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, a yearly survey that has been conducted from 1992 to the present by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University.

View the survey: National Survey of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992–present) — Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

Why? This survey, while not all-inclusive or definitive, nonetheless documents Taiwan’s changing attitudes on identity from three simple, specific standpoints. Respondents are asked whether they identify themselves as 1) Taiwanese, 2) both Taiwanese and Chinese, or 3) Chinese. A fourth category is for those that have no response, which can be interpreted in a variety of ways from not wanting to commit, not wanting to be bothered or even as Taiwanese indigenous.

The obvious biggest change over the years is seen in those who identify themselves solely as Taiwanese. This has risen dramatically from 17.6 percent in 1992 to reaching and leveling off near 63.3 percent between 2020 and 2026.

There, approximately two-thirds of the respondents, now identify themselves solely as Taiwanese; this rise marks a significant increase of 45.7 percent from 1992.

In the opposite direction the biggest drop is found in those who see themselves solely as Chinese; this went from 25.5 percent in 1992 to the current nadir, 2.5 percent.

Those that see themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese has also dropped from 46.4 percent in 1992 to the current 30.7 percent; thus less than one-third now identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Those with No Response also dropped from 10.5 percent to 3.7 percent, indicating that almost all now have some opinion.

How the various respondents judge their identity is open and is no doubt determined by many factors.

Here, I offer a personal perspective. I currently carry two passports, a US passport and a Taiwanese passport. If I wanted to do the paperwork, I could also easily obtain a third passport from Ireland. Three of my grandparents are from that nation, which has a “grandparent” clause that allows such. I once even considered this when examining job offers in the EU. So how then do I identify myself?

In general, I normally identify myself as American, and sometimes as Irish-American, yet at other times I also present myself as Taiwanese. It all depends on the circumstances and situation. When getting my Taiwanese passport, though my paperwork had been approved in 2020, I purposely waited until 2021 to get the new passport. Why? I specifically wanted a passport which emphasized the name of Taiwan on the cover.

What then about ancestry? This also can be complex and no doubt play a part in identity. I also once took a DNA test and while I found as expected I had over 80 percent Celtic ancestry, nonetheless from my other grandparent I had a wide range to identify with. That included Scandinavian, Eastern Europe, Jewish, Iberian Peninsula, the Caucasus and more.

It becomes evident in many surveys that identity and national identity are not simple matters. Recognized tribes make up a small percentage of Taiwan’s population; however, communities, families, intermarriage and daily life all shape how people make their own choices.

What can one make of these categories? What does it mean to vote for one’s identity and does one have an optional choice? Any such study must account for known contexts and clichés, whether Maori in New Zealand, Indonesian-Chinese and others. But one of Taiwan’s major milestones in history had impact and influenced the sense of identity of its people.

That milestone began when Taiwan’s first Legislative Yuan was fully elected by all citizens in multi-party elections. Before then, the ROC’s KMT state under Martial Law and its short period after the end of World War II under Chiang Kai-shek and, between 1978 and 1987, the Taiwan Garrison Command’s secret police enforced party control and disbanded opposition.

Four years later, in 1996, Taiwan proceeded through its first full democracy. Some might say that Taiwan’s prior period was a relative Stockholm Syndrome period for the KMT. While Taiwan’s White Terror (1947-1987) was ending, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) formed in 1986 when, although forbidden and technically illegal, the DPP dangwai (outside party) opposition was tolerated and allowed to run.

In the decade after 1979, the US, protecting against the PRC, kept Taiwan within its strategy of ambiguity, differing principles and numerous dimensions.

An additional, second factor arrived when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian defeated James Soong and Lien Chan in a split election. That year contributed to Taiwan being openly parallel to the PRC. From 2001 to 2008, even as voters chose continuity, the downward trend continued. Under Ma Ying-jeou, did the trend reverse? On identity, it continued to steadily answer the query. The percentage identifying solely as Chinese has dwindled to a minuscule 2.4 percent.

Are these voters die-hard KMT? Could they be on Kinmen or Matsu, front-line islands adjacent to China? Taiwan was ceded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, and Japan was not at fault for those who after 50 years were still caught in overlapping identities. And during the repeated debates of Japan’s Diet just before WWII, there were those who, with humorous vein, remembered their late military service and family surnames tied to Taiwan.

This leads many to find comfort in the feeling that Taiwan is still too often spoken of as if its statehood is only theoretical. Yet according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on statehood, it meets the four requirements. It has territory, population, government and capacity to enter relations with other states. It has survived outside the UN.

Yes, there are many states that don’t recognize Taiwan. Some do so because they receive lucrative trade benefits or subsidies from the PRC. Ironically, this does not diminish Taiwan’s reality. Its passport and visa access rank 31st in the Henley Passport Index, while China is in a lower range near the mid-50s to 60th.

To sum up, Taiwan’s identity is clearly highlighted by the way Taiwanese have grown to recognize their independent government. De jure or de facto, as the saying says, you can have many choices, but you cannot change what we wish to be blocked.