Taiwan, Identity Politics, and the Changing Status Quo

Tuesday, September 1, 2026, by Jerome F. Keating Ph.D.

What is the true national identity of Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC)? How do its people see it?

This seemingly simple question is quite complex and continues to gain in importance as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increases its gray-zone activities around the island nation and any hope of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is constantly threatened.

For Taiwanese and for the world, a crucial tell-tale illustration worth regularly reviewing in these times is the National Survey of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, a yearly survey that has been conducted from 1992 to the present by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University.

View the survey: National Survey of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992–present) — Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

Why? This survey, while not all-inclusive or definitive, nonetheless documents Taiwan’s changing attitudes on identity from three simple, specific standpoints. Respondents are asked whether they identify themselves as 1) Taiwanese, 2) both Taiwanese and Chinese, or 3) Chinese. A fourth category is for those that have no response, which can be interpreted in a variety of ways from not wanting to commit, not wanting to be bothered or even as Taiwanese indigenous.

The obvious biggest change over the years is seen in those who identify themselves solely as Taiwanese. This has risen dramatically from 17.6 percent in 1992 to reaching and leveling off near 63.3 percent between 2020 and 2026.

There, approximately two-thirds of the respondents, now identify themselves solely as Taiwanese; this rise marks a significant increase of 45.7 percent from 1992.

In the opposite direction the biggest drop is found in those who see themselves solely as Chinese; this went from 25.5 percent in 1992 to the current nadir, 2.5 percent.

Those that see themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese has also dropped from 46.4 percent in 1992 to the current 30.7 percent; thus less than one-third now identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Those with No Response also dropped from 10.5 percent to 3.7 percent, indicating that almost all now have some opinion.

How the various respondents judge their identity is open and is no doubt determined by many factors.

Here, I offer a personal perspective. I currently carry two passports, a US passport and a Taiwanese passport. If I wanted to do the paperwork, I could also easily obtain a third passport from Ireland. Three of my grandparents are from that nation, which has a “grandparent” clause that allows such. I once even considered this when examining job offers in the EU. So how then do I identify myself?

In general, I normally identify myself as American, and sometimes as Irish-American, yet at other times I also present myself as Taiwanese. It all depends on the circumstances and situation. When getting my Taiwanese passport, though my paperwork had been approved in 2020, I purposely waited until 2021 to get the new passport. Why? I specifically wanted a passport which emphasized the name of Taiwan on the cover.

What then about ancestry? This also can be complex and no doubt play a part in identity. I also once took a DNA test and while I found as expected I had over 80 percent Celtic ancestry, nonetheless from my other grandparent I had a wide range to identify with. That included Scandinavian, Eastern Europe, Jewish, Iberian Peninsula, the Caucasus and more.

I point this out because within Taiwan, there are 16 officially recognized indigenous tribes, which make up approximately 3 percent of the population. Further, many coming to the island have intermarried with the indigenous people. Would those indigenous who have not intermarried cast a vote of no response? The survey purposely does not include indigenous as an optional choice.

Anyone who has studied this matter knows that some Taiwanese indigenous identify more closely to the Maori of New Zealand and the Austronesian peoples.

Also important to the survey but not officially mentioned are milestone dates from Taiwan’s history, which no doubt easily impacted and influenced the changing sense of identity.

The survey began in 1992, which was the first year when members of the Legislative Yuan were directly elected by all the people in multi-party elections. Before that, the ROC had been a one-party KMT state under Martial Law and its legislators were those that had been elected on the continent shortly after the end of World War II. They came over with Chiang Kai-shek.

Martial Law on Taiwan officially ended in 1987, but 1992 was further crucial because that was the year that the Garrison Command, the secret police who enforced Martial Law, was disbanded.

Four years later, the year 1996 marked the time that the people could also directly elect the president of the nation. Thus the survey proceeded through the years with the nation’s full democracy and free elections. Some might say that the people began to experience a release from the Stockholm Syndrome of the previous period of the KMT’s White Terror (1947–1987) and Martial Law.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had been formed in 1986, when parties other than the KMT were forbidden. Though technically illegal, the DPP dangwai (those outside the party) were tolerated and became officially recognized in 1989.

Other factors that impacted Taiwan politics included how a decade earlier in 1979 the US, Taiwan’s main protector, had officially recognized the PRC as the sole government of China.

Nonetheless, the US kept the Taiwan question open with what it called “strategic ambiguity” and its difference between the one China principle and the one-China policy as to whether Taiwan was or was not a part of China.

These numerous factors have no doubt influenced the changing dimensions and perceptions of Taiwan’s identity. An additional milestone was in Taiwan’s second presidential election where the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian defeated James Soong and Lien Chan who split the KMT vote.

Those past years no doubt contributed to changes in identity where being only Taiwanese and being both Taiwanese and Chinese ran parallel from 2001to 2008. However, from 2008 on, the respondents choosing both Taiwanese and Chinese continued in its downward trend.

Even the following eight years when KMT Ma Ying-jeou was president did not reverse this drop. On the other hand, the sense of people identifying only as Taiwanese continued to steadily rise.

There are no doubt many special questions one might query about the survey. For example who are the minuscule number of Taiwanese who now identify themselves as only Chinese? This category has reached the current nadir of only 2.4 of the population.

Are these voters die-hard KMT? Would they be people who live on Kinmen and Matsu, which are front line islands quite adjacent to the PRC and islands that were never included as part of Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki?

In 1895, Japan became the first nation to rule not parts of Taiwan but the whole island; it then ruled for 50 years. And during that time, Taiwanese long petitioned for representation in the Japanese Diet, only to get it just before WWII ended. They had a sense of democracy even then.

In a more humorous vein, I recently recall how a KMT military officer whose family surely had to have come to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek, told me in confidence that he felt that even in 2025 the Taiwanese were still “too Japanese” in their thinking. This was nearly 80 years after WWII had ended. Would he be one of the few who identified as “Chinese only” on the survey?

Other more serious questions can be asked as Taiwanese express their identity. Taiwan has de facto nationhood according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention since it meets the 4 requirements to be a nation.

However, only 12 nations have relations with Taiwan, and it is not a member of the UN. Yet among the many nations that don’t officially recognize it, most do so because they do not wish to lose the lucrative trade benefits and subsidies, which the PRC uses as carrots.

Ironically these same nations do however give Taiwan far better treatment in visa free access than they do the PRC. Thus, there it ranks 31st to 34th In the Henley Passport Index while the PRC trails with a ranking of 55 to 60th.

To sum up, this simple survey clearly highlights the changing complexity and challenges of Taiwan’s status where two-thirds of the people now see themselves as only Taiwanese; and one-third see themselves as having both Taiwanese and Chinese roots. The ambiguity of their de facto independence is sufficient. De jure can wait, because if less than 3 percent now see themselves as only Chinese and some 4 percent have no response, then as the song says, you don’t have to be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing. *